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Method for Theory:
    A Prelude to Human Ecosystems
                                                       H.E. KUCHKA
                            INSCRIPTION ON A BRIDGE AT THE SUMMER PALACE OF THE FORMER EMPERORS OF CHINA
THERE ARE THREE MONKEYS WHO CANNOT SEE THEIR FACES.
THERE IS A BRIDGE BUT NO WATER.
THERE ARE WINDOWS BUT THEY DO NOT OPEN.
THERE IS A TABLET BUT NO WORDS.
THERE IS A MIRROR BUT YOU CANNOT SEE YOUR FACE.
THERE IS A GATE BUT NO ONE PASSES THROUGH.
                                                                    Truth in Advertising:
                   The following essay is a somewhat twisted mimicry of Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994.
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Preface
This two-part essay represents the product of an exercise in developing method for theory, beginning
Fall 1999 in the Complex Systems II graduate seminar in the Department of Anthropology at the
University of Georgia. It was motivated by dissatisfaction with both the understanding and practice of
theory building presently available in ecological anthropology. We sought to integrate an expansive
approach to method-for-theory with our developing human ecosystems perspective.
We needed a strong method-for-theory to provide a common framework for our diverse interests
in human ecosystems. Ecological Understanding (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994) was chosen as the
model exposition. As a guiding model it is an excellent place to begin. Cleverly done, well organized,
easy to read, it misses very little about the nature of theory relevant to biological ecology. Our immedi-
ate goal was to rework its structure and content in the service of human ecology, particularly to enhance
our approach to human ecosystems.
The author of this essay is given as H. E. Kuchka. H. E. is the abbreviation for Human Ecosys-
tems. Kuchka is the group.1 This moniker was inspired in part by the character and creative spirit of
the late 19th Century musical study group in Russia that included Rimsky-Korsakov, known in the
West as the Mighty Five. Our group’s ultimate goal is to establish a truly anthropological under-
standing of human ecosystems, drawing upon a broad range of human variation and historical
perspectives, while at the same time adapting the compositional techniques and scholastic back-
grounds of other, more mature, ecological disciplines.
1 In this production it was Felice S. Wyndham, Eric C. Jones, Mitchell A. Pavao-Zuckerman, Suzanne E. Joseph, Rebecca
K. Zarger and Charles R. Peters, with contributions from David G. Casagrande, John R. Stepp and Warren P. Roberts.
Felice S. Wyndham, Guest Editor
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INTRODUCTION:
INTEGRATION IN
 HUMAN ECOLOGY
Two themes will be addressed throughout this
essay. The first is that there is both a need and an
opportunity for greater integration in the discipline
of human systems ecology. The second is that the
tools are already available to achieve greater inte-
gration, especially if it is recognized that human
ecosystems are predominantly evolving and dy-
namic information-ecosystems. Our task here is
to conceptually explore the implications of this
realization, in search of a broader understanding
of the nature of human ecosystems. But first we
must lay out a framework for the development of
theory in the service of disciplinary integration.
Toward this goal, this essay is divided into two main
sections. The first section is concerned with the
methods and rationale for developing integrative
theory in human ecology. The second section ap-
plies these methods to sketching some of the com-
ponents of a nascent theory of human ecosystems,
our initial working experiment in the utility of dis-
ciplinary integration in human ecology.
The task of understanding humans has tra-
ditionally been rather strictly divided. The humani-
ties study the informational aspects of human so-
cieties–art, religion, literature, history–while biolo-
gists and a few ecologists and anthropologists tackle
physical, medical, behavioral and cognitive com-
ponents. We propose that to begin to understand
human systems, a human ecology paradigm2 must
be developed that integrates these two historical
trajectories. The discipline of anthropology has
been at the intersection of these two trajectories
since its conception and is thus a good place to
prescribe the radical integration of sociocultural
ecology and biophysical ecology.
To get a feel for what an integrated human
ecology might look like we offer the following in-
troductory preview. After examining each on its
own, try to look simultaneously at the four graphi-
cal conceptualizations of human systems presented
in Figures 1a through 1d. The goal of this exercise
is to promote the kind of radical synthesis needed
for a truly integrated human ecology. Each of these
models adds unique conceptual constructs and
graphic representations of the problems and po-
tentials of the human condition.
H. T. Odum’s model (Figure 1a) abstractly
delineates the actors in the system of interest, the
relevant flow of energy, and depicts the concept of
energy upgrading across the subsystems. Forrester
(Figure 1b) is more successful at depicting the in-
formation network, the cumulative effect of flows
and their informational triggers. Larkin’s chart of
the Christian spirit world (Figure 1c) is composed
of highly abstracted (moral) relations and flows
between supernaturals and humans in a metaphysi-
cal universe. Depicting a particular belief system
at a particular time and place in history, this figure
is a good diagrammatic example of the kind of in-
formational systems that humans create and oper-
ate within. Robins’ model (Figure 1d), inspired by
the Church of the Subgenius, presents surreal
graphic narrative, a postmodern belief system in
perverse parallel to Larkin’s Christian representa-
tion of the spiritual universe. Robins uses tradi-
tional and postmodern techniques, such as humor
and confronting the strangeness of the familiar.
This brings home the importance of creative imagi-
nation, human perversities and fictitious relation-
ship in the formation and function of human eco-
systems. Our position with regard to method-for-
theory is that a synthetic understanding of human
ecology must integrate the creative/imaginary/su-
pernatural systems with those previously recognized
as ecology sensu stricto.
2 A paradigm is a worldview, belief system, series of assumptions, methods and techniques, and exemplars for problem
solution held in common by a scientific community (cf. Khun 1970).
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To help imagine that a synthesis of these di-
verse aspects of human ecology is possible, we of-
fer Rappaport’s (1971,1984) model of ritual regu-
lation and ecosystem function among the Maring,
a horticultural people of the New Guinea High-
lands (Figure 1e). Here, complex relationships with
a powerful spirit world are integrated in a holistic
understanding of the supernatural belief system,
community and inter-group social relations, and
local subsistence activities. A human ecosystems
theory premised on the methodological prescrip-
tion of radical synthesis must begin where
Rappaport left off. All relevant components of hu-
man ecology, i.e. physical, biological, social and cul-
tural (including spiritual) must be integrated in the
development of models that attempt to describe, and
ultimately understand, human ecosystems.
Recommendation note for reading the rest of
this essay
After perusing the six introductory system illumi-
nations, you may wish to go directly to Section II,
in which the prelude to human ecosystem theory
is laid out. After skimming this section, you can
go back to  Section I: Method for Theory and en-
tertain the document in its entirety.
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FIGURE 1C. THE SPIRIT WORLD: A CHRISTIAN BELIEF SYSTEM (Larkin 1920).
Originally designed as a wall chart for Clarence Larkin’s Baptist ministry4 in early 20th Century
Pennsylvania, this graphic model displays the historico-spiritual (proscribed) evolution of humankind
(from left to right) with special attention to differential pathways followed by human souls in their
obligatory relationship to celestial spirits. This is a system regulated by the gates/switches of Divine
Judgement (upper right corner), where souls are sorted into the ‘Righteous’ and the ‘Wicked,’ each
with separate final destinations (‘Heaven’ and ‘The Lake of Fire,’ respectively). The Spirit World is an
alternate universe that Christians gain access to in the after-life. In this system, final decisions are
made by supreme beings; humans are regulated as flows of matter (reposited bodies that are redistrib-
uted at resurrection and judgement, upper right) and as energy (eternal souls) that unite upper panels (‘The
Heavenly Places’) with the mundane (three Earths, Paradise and Hell). A fundamental dialectical tension is
maintained between ‘Righteous Spirits’ (Christ, God, Pure Angels) and ‘Wicked Spirits’ (Satan and other Fallen
Angels), while humans negotiate between the two.
4Larkin (1850-1924) was trained as a draftsman and was called to preach the Word of God later in life. He created at least 62
religious wall charts, relying heavily on his early training in the graphical representation of systemic functioning for expression and
illumination of his religious beliefs.
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SECTION I.
METHOD FOR THEORY
This section is concerned with the structure and
use of theory. Following Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
(1994) we recognize the value of explicitly laying
out methods5 and conceptual constructs for build-
ing theory and promoting intellectual integration.
This effort relies on a long history of development
in the philosophy of science that we will not do
justice to here, as our goal is to provide only a brief
overview of the nature of theory, motivations for
its development, taxonomy, anatomy, ontogeny,
and some of the environmental contexts in which
it is found. Together, these constitute method-for-
theory.6 This framework will then be used to sketch
the raw beginnings of an integrative theory of hu-
man ecosystems in Section II.
A. THE NATURE OF THEORY
In addition to the plausible benefits of increasing
precision in conceptualization and clarity in com-
munication, sensitivity to the structure of theory
offers some less tangible rewards. Among the ra-
tionales for sensitivity to theory, Pickett, Kolasa
and Jones (1994:58) point out that theory “[h]elps
you make decisions about what to do next in a
world in which ‘everything is a little bit interest-
ing’ but only some things are worthwhile,” and
also, “[p]revents you from getting lost in the threat-
ening tide of details.”
Sensitivity to the nature of theory also puts
dichotomous and fragmented debates into perspec-
tive (see Figure 2), since exclusionary tendencies
often develop out of protracted dichotomous de-
bate. Examples from our intellectual heritage in-
clude the irritating nature/culture debate (for dis-
cussion see Scoones 1999:486); and the old Car-
tesian mind-body separation problem. Gaps in
understanding widen as polar positions become
entrenched. Discontinuity and fragmented under-
standings may become ends in themselves, perpetu-
ating closed intellectual environments. Nonethe-
less, dichotomous debate can be resolved through
integration, ultimately leading to more holistic
understandings.
Theoretical Progress Via Integration
An initial simplified working definition of inte-
gration is the amalgamation of existing theory,
perspectives, approaches, models or data that are
apparently disparate. Although a desirable goal,
achieving integration is not easy. Some of the pro-
cedures and circumstances necessary for successful
integration include: (1) Specifying Domain. For
integration to happen, the focus or domain of the
relevant theories/subdisciplines, which are the sub-
jects of integration, must be clearly stated. With
clearly defined subject matter and boundaries, the
development of linkages between the theories be-
comes more feasible. (2) Conceptual Clarification.
The domain is not the only component of theory
that needs to be clearly delineated. There is usu-
ally confusion about the meanings and subjects of
specific concepts within a theory. Clarification of
concepts also enables the asking of new questions
that may further integration and the development
of theory. (3) Consideration of Scale and Level. In-
tegration requires consideration of the scale(s) at
which a theory operates. Theories may answer ques-
tions across levels of organization, particularly ad-
jacent levels of a particular scale, as in Figure 3a
(bottom part) or Table 1.
Studies within ecology sensu lato can be or-
dered on several axes to illustrate the diversity of
research areas within this arena (Likens 1992).
Figure 3a represents the subdisciplines of bioecol-
ogy7 ordered along an axis of abiotic to biotic foci
(Likens 1992; Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994).
5 ‘Methods,’ as used here, refers to principles of inquiry. ‘Techniques’ refers to crafted procedures and proficient artisanal
skills. The focus of this essay is on methods.
6 Method-for-theory refers to the process of understanding what theory is, how it is constructed and how it is used to
achieve goals of understanding and explanation.
7 Here, bioecology refers to what is more conventionally simply called ‘ecology,’ to facilitate use of the term ecology (sensu
lato) for the domain that includes both biophysical ecology and sociocultural ecology.
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FIGURE 2. RIDING THE WAVE (Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology 1999:91).
The postmodern consumer capitalist environment as a final commentary on the relevance of di-
chotomous and fragmented contemporary discourse. Humor, because it is an innate mechanism for
dealing with cognitive dissonance, can raise representational states to higher levels of complexity. In
this case anthropological debate is situated within the impending doom of a runaway revolution in
information technology. Here the felt need for a more holistic understanding or overarching theory is
created by the reader’s eye view.
LAST
    BITE
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The diverse discipline of human ecology can also
be schematically depicted along axes of organiza-
tion. As such, Figure 3b includes some of the sub-
disciplines and subject matter that contribute to
human ecology. This contributing subject matter
is ordered: (1) horizontally within multiple catego-
ries of environment (physical, biological, cultural,
and social); and (2) vertically along a hierarchical
scale of organization (individual to population to
world systems). The diversity of the contributing
subject matter illustrates the daunting challenge
presented to those interested in achieving integra-
tion within human ecology.
Understanding and Explanation
Understanding is experience made intelligible by
applying concepts and categories to apprehending
the general relations between particulars. Scientific
understanding is an ‘objectively’ determined match
between some set of confirmable, observable phe-
nomena in the non-human and human world(s)
and a conceptual construct. Some of the compo-
nents of this type of understanding can be seen in
Figure 4. Our take on the components reflects a
philosophy of human sciences that draws heavily
on the humanities.
FIGURE 3A. SPECTRUM OF ECOLOGICAL SUBDISCIPLINES (Modified from Likens 1992).
The field of ecology, in the broadest sense, incorporates a variety of studies ranging from those
that focus on abiotic relationships to those that focus on biotic relationships. The bottom part
of the figure depicts one of many possible dimensional axes for topic areas and subdisciplines
in biological ecology.
ABIOTIC FOCUS
BIOTIC FOCUS
B
Biogeochemistry
Ecosystem Ecology
Landscape Ecology
Community Ecology
Population Ecology
Behavioral Ecology
Physiological Ecology
Meteorology
Hydrology
Geology
Systematics
Physiology
Genetics
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FIGURE 3B. HIERARCHY OF HUMAN ECOLOGY WITH CONTRIBUTING TOPIC AREAS AND SUBDISCIPLINES.
Human ecology is a broad field. Contributing topic areas and subdisciplines can be ordered along two
axes. The first (horizontal) axis illustrates the four environments (physical, biological, social, and cultural)
in which subdisciplines focus their studies. Not all contributors operate in all four environments. The
second (vertical) axis illustrates the scale of organization at which the subdisciplines and subject matter
tend to operate. The multiple environments exist in a vertical hierarchy of organization, from the indi-
vidual (reproduction of daily life) at the lowest level on up to the population, and ultimately to the
highest level, the global world system. We have located some subfields relevant to human ecology in a
hierarchy across the scope of multiple environments. This is by no means an exhaustive accounting of
possible subfields.
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The relationship between understanding and
explanation is that explanation is the process of
relating conceptual constructs to observable phe-
nomena, and understanding is the professed and
hoped for result of this process. Explanation may
(among other things): (1) relate phenomena (pat-
terns) to causal mechanisms; (2) resolve phenom-
ena into processes at lower hierarchical levels (Pattee
1973); and (3) contextualize phenomena within
larger processes.
B. MOTIVATING THEORY:
     FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
     AND RADICAL SYNTHESIS
Fundamental Questions
“Fundamental questions are the most effective tools
for advancing understanding because they address
any one of five ways to improve theory” (Pickett,
Kolasa and Jones 1994:113). Specifically, funda-
mental questions can lead to: (1) establishment of
TABLE 1. HIERARCHY OF HUMAN ECOLOGICAL LEVELS.
8 Dual Significations: two interpretations of the depicted scope and domain are possible. The first is the possible scope
of an individual’s world, represented by three examples (A,B,C hexagons): (A) a jet-setter with big business or NGO
connections; (B) the president of one of the big-five nations; (C) a local community leader. The second interpretation
is that the three hexagons depict possible theoretical domains or (dis)continua across human ecological levels: (A) full
spanning of all levels; (B) ruptured understanding; (C) restricted scope of analysis.
ECOLOGICAL
 LEVEL
SCOPE AND DOMAIN8 SOME
COMPONENTS/
PRINCIPLES
INTELLECTUAL
AWARENESS
 to date
WORLD SYSTEMS
    Global
    Subregional
Components include
global synoptic
processes down to
local systems
Dominated by
fragmented logics
POPULATION
   Cities
   Communities
   Demes
   Family/Household
Components are
populations in local
systems
Analysis of
aggregates
Demographic bias
INDIVIDUAL
 Socially Interacting
 Socially Isolated
      A       B       C
Components include
physiological
processes
(harmonics) in the
individual as a
system with input and
output environments
Consensus/
Optimality
EEAness
(Environments of
Evolutionary
Adaptedness)
Individuals as agents
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FIGURE 4. COMPONENTS OF SCIENTIFIC UNDERSTANDING (Adapted from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994, Fig.2).
This model represents a way of parsing out some of the responsibilities of a method for building
theory. Conceptual constructs are continually refined through two processes. The first involves
internal refinement through the use of several conceptual tools. The second results from
(re)specification of the domain, particularly the definition of relationships between different concep-
tual constructs. Delimiting the domain requires that attention be paid to scope, scale and process,
but it also requires the employment of methodological tools for relating the domain to observable
phenomena. Typically, science is caricatured as doing this through hypothesis testing (via rules for
evidence), causal explanation and model building. Understanding in the field of human ecology
requires additional methodological tools for teasing out complexity. Typically external to theory
building, applied human ecology requires management tools to relate the ‘real world’ to the theoreti-
cal framework. These tools are often critiqued for their inability to achieve goals. That this is the case
indicates a lack of development of these tools by the practitioners of management, resulting in part
from an emphasis on territoriality, immediate gain, advertising, and obfuscation of assumptions.
MANAGEMENTCONCEPTUALCONSTRUCTS DOMAIN
X. Tools
REFINEMENT
M. Tools
OBSERVABLE
PHENOMENA
Tools for Conceptual
Refinement
Scholarship Diversity
Fundamental Questions
Lateral Thinking
Assumptions
Definitions
Abstraction
  (Essentialization)
Classification
Simplification
Idealization
Reflexivity
Critical Theory
Deduction
Generalization
Holism
Delimiting
the Domain
Noumena
Processes
Flows
Relations
Individuals
Levels of
Organization
Scale
Dynamics
Methodological Tools
Expanding Contextualization
Developing Expectation
Dialectics
Surrealism
Deconstruction
Transformation
Model Building
Translation Modes
Causal Explanation
Multiple Working Hypotheses
Inductive Generalization
Rules of Evidence
(Mis)Management Tools
Accounting
Business Ethics
Shortsightedness
Unacknowledged Circumstances
Broad-scale-issue Avoidance
Biased Expertise
Privileging the Client
Disparagement of
  Complementary Initiatives
Pseudo-change
Solution Production
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theory or missing theoretical components; (2) re-
finement of theoretical components; (3) rejection
of inadequate theory or inadequate theoretical
components; (4) replacement of a theory or some
of its components; and (5) increasing the scope of
theory.
Figure 5 shows a number of types of ques-
tions that may not be mutually exclusive, but that
do have different motivations and foci. Among
these, fundamental questions are those aimed at
changing/advancing the structure or content of un-
derstanding. Their loci for action are usually the
conceptual constructs or the lines of interaction
between theory and observable phenomena (Fig-
ure 6). Limits to current understanding invite on-
going efforts to identify and address fundamental
questions as a crucial part of theory building.
Formulating fundamental questions can also
facilitate change in understanding by clarifying the
scope of inquiry. Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions
are an attempt to acknowledge different ways of
answering the question ‘Why?’ in biology. These
questions can be summarized as: (1) functional
(questions about the adaptiveness of behavior); (2)
proximate (questions about the mechanisms of
behavior); (3) ontogenetic (questions about how
behavior changes through development of an or-
ganism); (4) phylogenetic (questions about the
ways behavior changes as species evolve). By dis-
tinguishing between these fundamental types of
questions and the distinct answers they generate,
Tinbergen helped bring theoretical clarity to oth-
erwise sterile debates about which is the correct
response to any given ‘Why’ question.
FIGURE 5. TYPES OF QUESTIONS (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 6.2. Reproduced with permis-
sion of publisher).
Fundamental questions are concerned with the components of understanding within a field of
science. “Big” questions are broad scale. The labels “general” or “specific” refer to the size of the
conceptual scope or inclusiveness of the domain addressed. Important questions are those of societal
interest, whereas interesting questions are motivated by personal fascination. These types of question
are not mutually exclusive.
QUESTION
TYPES
FUNDAMENTAL
Components of Understanding
BIG
Scale
INTERESTING
Personal
GENERAL
Scope
IMPORTANT
Of Societal Concern
SPECIFIC
ScopeScope
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“In case several fundamental questions are
competing for attention, they may be ranked ac-
cording to their logical precedence, clarity, and po-
tential to unify” (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994:113). Fundamental questions should be pri-
oritized to the extent that they are interesting, fea-
sible, fulfill logical requirements already present in
theory, establish sound and clear concepts (Novak
and Gowin 1984), as well as definitions and inter-
actions, while encompassing a broad scope so as to
advance generality (Kuhn 1977, Mayr 1982,
Slobodkin 1985). Even if such questions are privi-
leged they may lead to incorrect theory, but in the
process greater clarity of concepts, hypotheses and
tests may be achieved.
Fundamental questions should tend, by defi-
nition, to new theories.9 While keeping the scope
of the inquiry in mind, fundamental questions ask
about observed patterns of phenomena and pos-
sible explanatory processes/mechanisms. In this en-
deavor, judgement, reason and previously accepted
ideas must be temporarily suspended so as not to
constrain the person or group who seek alterna-
tive explanations (see Appendix for more on the
possibilities of team thinking). Alternative expla-
nations also come from within theory by unrea-
sonably performing an extreme application of the
building blocks of theory (generalization, idealiza-
tion, abstraction, hierarchical integration), indi-
vidually or in combination with others.
UNDERSTANDING
CONCEPTUAL
CONSTRUCTS
OBSERVABLE
PHENOMENA
FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS
Establish
Refine
Reject
Replace
Expand
FIGURE 6. THE RELATIONSHIP OF FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS TO UNDERSTANDING (From Pickett, Kolasa
& Jones 1994, Fig. 6.1. Reproduced with permission of publisher).
Fundamental questions can change understanding in one or more of five ways by which they affect
theory: by establishing new theory; refining existing theory or components of existing theory; reject-
ing theory or components of theory; replacing flawed theory or components; and expanding existing
domains of theory.
9 Where do radically new theories come from?  See the Green Hat, Appendix.
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C. TAXONOMY OF THEORY
A taxonomy of theory must reflect differences
among the goals or objectives, the structure, and
the foci of domains of different kinds of theories,
and hence, their modes of understanding. As a re-
sult of differences in objectives, structure and do-
main, theories can be classified along at least the
four axes of temporality, phenomenology, abstrac-
tion and generality (see Table 2). But, because theo-
ries are complex systems, a single theory can have
components that span different classes. The four
axes are not mutually exclusive.
Temporality
Theoretical understandings differ in their empha-
sis on the degree and kinds of causality attributed
to prior states vs. current relationships. The term
‘contingency’ allows the understanding that cur-
rent relationships and constraints have accumulated
from past interactions.
Integration and Synthesis
Theoretical understanding changes through the
integration of disparate paradigms. This is the op-
tion of radical synthesis. Specifying the disparate
paradigms and identifying possible fundamental
questions to guide cross-paradigm integration helps
to articulate an idea toward which integration can
aspire.
Two general ways of synthesizing disparate
areas of understanding are additive and extractive
integration. In the first, two or more complete theo-
ries are connected, perhaps ultimately merged,
through the implications of asking a very broad
scale question. The paradox of additive integration
is that the product may be more than the sum of
its parts (Figure 7a). In extractive integration, se-
lected components of different theories are
recontextualized to provide new building blocks
and relations. Here the result is expected to be syn-
ergistic (Figure 7b).
TABLE 2. KINDS OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Table 5.1).
10 Continua rather than strict dichotomies.
Classes Dichotomous Characters
Instantaneous
Vs.
Long term
Ahistorical
Still Life
Historical
Evolutionary
Phenomenological
vs.
Mechanistic
Dynamic (emergent)
Existentialistic
Dialectical
Static (design)
Mechanical
Nondialectical
Abstract10
vs.
Literal
Axiomatic
Formal
Normative
Hypothetical
Postulative
Nonaxiomatic
Factual
Descriptive
Empirical
Constructive
General10
vs.
Specific
Universal
Strategic
Local
Tactical
29Method for TheoryVol. 5  2001
FIGURE 7B. EXTRACTIVE INTEGRATION (From Pickett, Kolasa & Jones 1994, Fig. 7.2. Reproduced with
permission of publisher).
Select parts of existing theories may be extracted and synthesized to formulate new, integrated
understanding. Extractive integration is often motivated by general or “big” questions.
FIGURE 7A. ADDITIVE INTEGRATION (From Pickett, Kolasa & Jones 1994, Fig. 7.1. Reproduced with permis-
sion of publisher).
Two or more relatively complete areas of understanding can be linked or amalgamated in their
entirety to produce new theoretical understanding. This synthesis is additive integration. The impe-
tus for such integration often comes from general or “big” questions.
Additive Integration
Understanding 1 Understanding 2
UNDERSTANDING
Understanding 1 Understanding 2
SYNTHESIS
BIG QUESTIONS
UNDERSTANDING 3
Understanding 1 Understanding 2
SYNTHESIS
BIG QUESTIONS
Extractive Integration
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Phenomenology
Theories may conceptualize phenomena as being
caused by dynamic interactions (phenomenology)
which are not reducible to components at lower
levels, or as being caused by underlying mecha-
nisms. Hierarchical nesting usually allows us to
ignore typical contradictions between these two
extremes (Pattee 1973).
Abstraction
Models may range from highly specific space-time
contexts to abstract, ideal (including unreal) systems.
Generality
Theories unlinked by nesting or hierarchy to other
theory may maximize only two of the following
three parameters: generality, precision, realism
(Levins 1966). The degree of generality or speci-
ficity of a theory depends on the extent to which
both precision and realism are being employed. If
both are considered important, generality will be
minimal.
D. ANATOMY OF THEORY
Anatomy refers to the structure of theory, how it is
delimited and the components out of which it is
constructed. An overview of the variety of the com-
ponents of theory is presented in Box 1.
Basic Conceptual Components of Theory
Notions
Notions are informal beginnings. They are often
provided by imagination, intuition, analogy and
metaphor, and can provide material for the devel-
opment of theory. From the creative side come the
juxtapositions, psychotic brainstorms and insights
upon which methodological tools may be brought
to bear such that conceptual constructs are created
and domains constructed. If something is intu-
itively plausible, then it is likely a notion, as ma-
ture theory is often counterintuitive.
Assumptions
Assumptions include postulates, boundary condi-
tions, facts from other theories, and logical rela-
BOX 1. COMPONENTS OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 3.2).
Basic Conceptual Devices
Assumptions—conditions or axioms needed to build theory
Definitions—conventions and prescriptions necessary for the theory to work with clarity
Concepts—abstract ideas generalized from regularities in phenomena, or conceived
through reflection and imagination
Empirical Content
Facts—confirmable records of phenomena, checked and re-checked across time
Confirmed Generalizations—condensations and abstractions from a body of facts that
have been checked and re-checked
Derived Conceptual Devices
Hypotheses—testable statements derived from or representing various components of
theory
Models—conceptual constructs that represent or simplify the world or subject matter of
concern
Theorems—ideas or propositions deduced or proposed as demonstrable deductions
Framework and Structure
Framework––nested causal or logical structure of a theory
Domain––the scope in space, time and phenomena addressed by a theory
Translation modes––procedures and concepts needed to move from the abstractions of a
theory to the specifics of application or test
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tionships between facts. Assumptions are state-
ments about the nature of a domain. These axi-
oms are required before theory can be built. At the
start of systematic inquiry, guesswork is often re-
quired to choose among seemingly unlimited al-
ternative assumptions. Poorly developed theory can
result from leaving assumptions implicit rather than
making them explicit. Illumination of implicit or
background assumptions can be quite revealing.
Longino (1990) discusses the case in which the
same body of evidence is said to support conflict-
ing hypotheses or theories, depending upon the
investigator’s world view or background beliefs and
assumptions.
Definitions
Definitions express the essential nature of things.
They help specify and convey meanings in defi-
nite, clear and determining ways.  Among the
things that must be defined in a theory are the
basic objects and relationships that are the subject
matter of that theory.
Concepts
Concepts are generalizations or abstractions of
regularities, patterns, and imagined possibilities.
They can refer to individuals, phenomena or rela-
tionships (Leary 1985) that are explicit enough to
be evaluated.
Empirical Content of Theory
Observations
We distinguish between the observations that we
make when we are awake and those we make when
we are asleep and dreaming. Those observations
that we treat as matters-of-fact are open to re-evalu-
ation, their status as facts depend significantly on
the ongoing process of renewed observation, or in
the case of unique events, checking and
contextualizing the record.
Accepted Facts
In human systems the acceptance of facts depends
at least in part upon the conceptual environment.
Some propositions and the evidence that they are
facts may not be accepted, while other proposi-
tions with very little or no supporting evidence may
be treated as facts. Contrasting viewpoints and criti-
cal examination of underlying assumptions are two
of the procedures used in the consensual establish-
ment of facts.
Confirmed Generalizations
The abstraction of accumulated records of facts can
result in confirmed generalizations. This inductive
activity allows a group of observations or facts to
become a basic building block for theory, provid-
ing material for hypotheses, models and theorems.
Contingent on the qualities of the facts, confirmed
generalizations are given more credence as support-
ing evidence accumulates.
Derived Conceptual Components
of Theory
Hypotheses
Hypotheses relate conceptual constructs to observ-
able phenomena. They are tentative assumptions
and explanations that help formalize expectations
and provide grounds for action.
Models
Models are externalized simplified conceptual or
mental iconic representations of a system or pro-
cess, put forward as a basis for theoretical or em-
pirical understanding. Generally they depict some
of the overall structure of the system, and those
information causality pathways and materials/en-
ergy flows that result in the symptoms of interest.
Theorems
Theorems are derived constructs, deduced from
assumptions, definitions, basic concepts or the axi-
omatic structure of models and theories.
Theory Framework and Structure: Theory
as System
Framework
A theoretical framework unites all components of
theory in a coherent conceptual structure (Figure
8). Relationships between conceptual devices are
laid out, including the relations between back-
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FIGURE 8. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPONENTS OF THEORY.
This figure illustrates the relationships between the various components of theory (see Box 1). The
domain is the spatial and temporal scope that a theory addresses, while the framework of a theory
provides the logical structure. Observations of the ‘real world’ (from both within and without the
theory’s domain) contribute to notions and facts about that world. In time, facts can become con-
firmed generalizations. These empirical components inform basic conceptual devices (assumptions,
definitions and concepts). Translation modes relate the empirical content and basic conceptual
devices to more derived conceptual devices (hypotheses, models and theorems). Translation modes
also relate empirical content and the basic and derived conceptual devices to the real world phenom-
ena that the theory addresses through tests of proposed hypotheses. Additionally, translation modes
relate the empirical content, conceptual devices, and results of tested hypotheses to the structure of
the theory, allowing for revisions and clarification of the theory’s domain and framework.
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ground assumptions, theoretical constraints and the
conceptual inputs and outputs for theoretical mod-
els. Frameworks change as theories mature.
Hierarchy
The several potential domains of inquiry of a theory
should be related explicitly to each other in a mean-
ingful way. Typically, this occurs by creating a hi-
erarchical organization of (sub)theories varying by
scale in time, space and organization. As such,
domains are often covered by subtheories, which
may be used for different jobs (Pattee 1973) and
confer different levels of generality.
Domain
Domains delimit the scope in space, time and level
of organization of “a class of phenomena assumed
(by theory) to share certain properties and be of a
distinct and general type” (Hirschfeld and Gelman
1994:21). The domains of an inquiry should be
explicit and specific, as much as possible, though
they may be expanded or restricted as theory de-
velops. Domains typically become more and more
restricted as theory develops, because refinement
shows that the theory is not as grandly applicable
as originally presumed.
As mentioned above (under hierarchy), do-
mains may lend themselves to different levels of
generality depending on their breadth or their
scope. Particularly important for designating a
domain are the relevant phenomena, concepts, and
scales (time, space, organization). Conceptual con-
structs in a subtheory domain need not apply to
the broader theoretical domain nor to other
subtheories, but the importance of determining
whether or not they do apply cannot be overstated.
Translation Modes
Translation modes facilitate the conceptual trans-
position of abstract ideas, generalizations and mod-
els to specific domains and on-the-ground appli-
cations in experimental or field situations, and back
again.
Openness
To maintain a dialogue between abstract or ideal-
ized domains and observable phenomena for test-
ing and theory revision, a framework requires trans-
lation modes. The space that the translation modes
fill is inherently open. Openness in theoretical sys-
tems of understanding also is noted where observ-
able phenomena are renamed as facts or confirmed
generalizations, inside theoretical frameworks.
Openness of theory does not preclude the impor-
tance of axiomatic deduction in the development
of theory.
E. ONTOGENY OF THEORY
The utility of a theory depends upon its ontoge-
netic state, or degree of maturation, at a particular
point in time. Content and structure can change
along three axes: completeness, development and
integration (Box 2). Completeness refers to the
inclusion of items on the roster of theory compo-
Completeness—the different components of theory listed in Box 1 have different jobs to play
in a theory: More complete theories, i.e., those with more of the components, can do more of
the jobs required, e.g. abstract, simplify, generalize, explain, and predict, than those that are
less complete
Development—well-developed theory has more clearly derived conceptual constructs, more
explicit conceptually and empirically rich components, more thoroughly worked out and
refined components
Integration—in more mature theory, the connections among the components are better
articulated; dependency and unification are more explicit, with most of the components in place
and related to each other within a framework specifying structure of the theory  as a whole
BOX 2. THREE AXES OF THEORY CHANGE (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994, Box 4.1).
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nents in Box 1, keeping in mind that components
can be added. Development refers to the refinement
of components; they should be better worked out
over time. Integration is indicated by increasingly
well articulated connections among the components.
Why Theory Change is Important
“Failure to recognize how theory changes or in-
deed, that theory changes at all can be an impedi-
ment to furthering… understanding and integra-
tion” (Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994:86). Imma-
ture theories lack components and integrating
links. An immature theory may be prematurely
rejected or entirely ignored when it is subjected to
an over-designed test or heavily negative (non-con-
structive) criticism at an early developmental stage.
Ontogeny and Testing
Early in its development, a theory might not allow
appropriate tests of its validity. Without a speci-
fied framework, tests may encourage or discour-
age further development, but are quite meaning-
less. Even with a clear framework, strong theories
can fail to predict behavior. At this point, inter-
vening variables should be tested before throwing
the baby out with the bath water. This process is a
continual integration of related constructs, theo-
ries and paradigms, beholden to logical empirical
consistency.
Scope And Refutation
Broad-scoped, well-developed theories are less easily
refuted by only a few failures, since other variables
and theories may be integrated to save the theory.
Finer scale theories may be refuted by fewer cases
of failure, due to fewer possible intervening pro-
cesses, and less possibility of subdivision.
Conceptual Refinements
Conceptual constructs may be refined as a result
of expansion of observable phenomena (externally),
or logical or conceptual changes (internally). Ap-
plication of theory requires an awareness of the
ontogenetic status and development of the con-
ceptual constructs.
How Theories Change: Theory Assembly,
Development, Maturity
As theory develops, it becomes more and more
complete, by the addition and refinement of theo-
retical notions, constructs, derived constructs, and
structure. Figure 9 shows both increase in the num-
ber and refinement of components as theory ma-
tures. At first the emphasis is on the addition of
components. By the consolidating stage of theory
development all of the components are in place.
Subsequently, refinement of components is what
is emphasized. The refinement of components
marks a second stage in the development of theory.
Pre-theoretic—represented by rudimentary development of a few components
Intuitive—simple and fundamental components present, including definitions, concepts,
and models
Consolidating—derived conceptual devices begin to mature
Empirical-Interactive—with concepts, definitions, and domain increasingly clarified,
hypotheses are more amenable to evaluation
Confirmed or Rejected—judgement by the community of the adequacy of evaluation
and strength of those outcomes for a mature theory; confirmed theories often permit
practical application
BOX 3. STAGES TO THEORY MATURITY (Based on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 4.1 and
Figure 4.1).
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The stages of maturation shown in Figure 9
and summarized in Box 3 can be thought of as an
idealized developmental sequence. Theory change
is actually often haphazard, reflecting an amalgam
of different empirical pursuits and different
subtheories, and in some instances more complex
or highly derived components arise before simpler
ones. Drawing on other theories for components
may also result in transfer problems, where those
components acquire different meanings and inter-
pretations in their new context. Nonetheless, the
key idea is that the jobs a theory is able to do de-
pend upon its stage of maturity, i.e. the richness of
its roster of theoretical components and their re-
finement.
As a theory begins to take shape and to be
used it often becomes clear that existing compo-
nents must be replaced or refined. Theory may
emerge from pre-theoretic notions by adding com-
ponents, without showing much refinement. At
the consolidating stage basic conceptual compo-
nents are refined, empirical content is refined and
expanded, derived conceptual components are
added and refined, and the theoretical framework
and structure begin to become apparent. Measures
of component refinement include exactitude, em-
pirical certainty, applicability and derivativeness.
                                       DEGREE OF DEVELOPMENT
                               Status
           Component
Pre-
theoretic
Intuitive Consolidating Empirical-
Interactive
Confirmed
or Rejected
Notions ///// ///// ///// ///// ///////////
Assumptions ///// ////// ///////// ///////// ///////////
Definitions ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Concepts ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Facts ///// ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Confirmed
Generalizations ///// ////// ///////////
Hypotheses ///// ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Models ///// ////// ///////// ///////////
Theorems ///// ////// ///////////
Framework ///// ///// ///////////
Domain ///// ///// ////// /////// ///////////
Translation
Modes ///// ////// ///////////
FIGURE 9. COMPLETENESS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THEORY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 4.1).
See Box 1 for a description of the components. Degree of hatching denotes increased refinement and
precision in theory development.
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Exactitude
Exactitude reflects the explicitness of the compo-
nents of theory, how clearly assumptions are stated,
the completeness of the stated domain, and the
specificity and manner of presentation of the de-
rived conceptual components. Clarity of terminol-
ogy is a key aspect of exactitude. Because words
can sometimes have more than one meaning (for
example a word’s common versus its scientific us-
age) confusion regarding terminology often occurs.
One should therefore clearly and explicitly state
the meanings of terminology that are critical to a
theory. Imprecise words usually mean muddled
thoughts. If you are unable to state what you mean
explicitly, then the odds are good that you do not
really have a firm grasp on what it is that you are
trying to say. Perhaps you are dealing with the
ineffable.
Empirical Certainty
Empirical certainty reflects the degree to which
facts and empirical generalizations are confirmed
and evaluated, as well as the manner in which this
is done.
Applicability
Applicability centers largely on translation modes.
The applicability of a theory refers to how well the
derived conceptual components are applied to ob-
servable phenomena. The translation modes help
to link derived and empirical components.
Derivativeness
Derivativeness requires that the individual com-
ponents and their relationships be analyzed. Here
analysis refers to the working out of the implica-
tions of the components. Just as a theory develops
via a dialog between the theory and the world it is
designed to provide an understanding of, theories
also develop through a dialog between the compo-
nents of theory. This dialog will come from analy-
sis of theoretical components and the refinement
of theoretical concepts. Clarification of the com-
ponents of a theory usually leads to the revision of
the relationships between components. Internal
consistency is a hallmark of mature theory.
In mature theories, components are well de-
veloped, well integrated and provide completeness
(see Box 2). Complete theories have well-defined
basic conceptual constructs and derived concep-
tual devices, as well as well-delineated domains,
with internal structure and empirical content, al-
lowing the development of hypotheses that can be
confirmed or rejected. Confirmed mature theory
has developed through prior phases of pre-theory,
intuition, consolidation and empirical-interaction
(see Box 3). Such theories come to represent the
particular historical time periods within which
they have developed.
Methodological Tools in the Development
of Theory
A number of the methodological tools available to
develop and refine conceptual constructs are listed
in Figure 4. Diversity of scholarship is directly
related to the diversity in the backgrounds and
personalities of the investigators, as discussed be-
low under the environments of theory. The role
of fundamental questions was discussed at the be-
ginning of this section. Lateral thinking is a form
of educable creative intelligence presented most
clearly by de Bono (1990a). It is particularly use-
ful when coupled with the methodological skill
of volitionally shifting one’s mode of thinking,
the most well known examples being those in de
Bono’s (1990b) six-thinking-hats idiom (Appen-
dix). But this methodological skill, so ably pro-
moted by de Bono, is useful within all of the ‘tool’
boxes in Figure 4.
Development of the Practice and the Prac-
titioner: A Note on Skill Acquisition and
Techniques
Though this essay is primarily concerned with
methods in the development of theory, a note on
some prerequisites for utilizing the methods is per-
tinent. Several important points can be made. (1)
Group effort and diverse collaboration is essential.
Mead (1964:265-266) discusses the central role of
small ‘clusters’ of interacting individuals in the evo-
lution of ideas and the importance of “…creating
the conditions in which the appropriately gifted
can actually make a contribution…” rather than
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searching out and relying upon individual leaders.
De Bono’s (1990b) thinking hats technique (see
Appendix) can improve group communication
dynamics and productivity. (2) Creativity, imagi-
nation and lateral thinking should be encouraged.
(3) Taboos or prejudices about proper communi-
cation modes should be discarded if it is in the
interest of furthering theory. For example, the nar-
rative form is poorly suited to describing networks
of interactions in ecosystems. Graphical represen-
tations have multiple advantages (see Table 3).
Foremost among these is the skilled reader’s ability
to see a nearly simultaneous analytic and synthetic
understanding of the system portrayed. Though
descriptive diagrams/ illuminations are not tradi-
tional forms of communication in most schools of
TABLE 3. SOME PRINCIPLES OF CONCEPTION AND REPRESENTATION IN GRAPHICS (From Stepp 1999:49).11
11 Sources: Brainerd and Reyna (1990), Hutchins (1995), Johnson (1987), Lock and Peters (1996), Scaife and Rogers
(1996), Winn (1993), Zarger (1998), Zhang and Norman (1994).
Principles Explanatory Notes
1) Memory:
–short-term memory unloaded Short-term memory limitations are bypassed to the advantage of
processing
–long-term memory enhanced Long-term memory is shifted from rote to gist
–signs are more memorable Memorability is enhanced through iconography, i.e., graphical
"figures of speech" (e.g., metonymy), plus key words and phrases
2) Externalized Problem Solving:
–allows ease of manipulation Constructed externalizations, particularly icons, invite imaginative
manipulations
–guides reader/viewer interpretation Externalization plays a key role in completing any cognitive task
–near simultaneously analytic and
synthetic
Takes advantage of high-speed visual capabilities for resolving and
interpreting complex relationships
3) Semiotic Structure:
–simultaneously layered Concurrent elements at the sublexical, lexical and grammatical levels;
co-occurrence and multilayering are the pervasive structural
principles
–hierarchical (graphical) vs. linear
(text)
Flexibility of levels of entry into graphics, as well as flexibility in
directional processing
–transparency Pellucidity enhanced through simultaneous views, topography,
perspective and apparent movement
–emergent properties Graphical formulations (including higher maths) are complex
constructs whose implications their creators only partially anticipate;
their unpredicted properties lie well beyond the scope of narrative,
closer to the heart of lateral thinking (de Bono 1990a)
4) Graphic Literacy Skills:
–input and output competence Consumer-producer competence can be graded from knowledge, to
know-how, to skill
–rights as reader, rights as creator The implicit contract is that both reader/viewer and creator/producer
will continually upgrade their levelsof comprehension and expression
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anthropology their use is recommended because
of the heuristic advantages they confer. This means
that practitioners are held responsible for develop-
ing their skill in reading and communicating in
new, possibly unconventional modes.Other ex-
amples are humor, cartoons, and satire.
F. THEORY AND ITS
    ENVIRONMENTS
Constraint and Objectivity in Ecological
Integration
To pursue radical integration and to bring together
disparate paradigms, it is necessary to determine
how paradigms, theories, and theoretical practices
themselves constrain integration, and how those
constraints may be overcome.
Two sources of constraints inject bias into the
Academy: 1) bias that originates in society at large;
and 2) bias that operates within the intellectual
community. These constraints (often in the form
of hidden assumptions) act as filters and control
gates that influence intellectual thought and ex-
change. Within the Academy there are three addi-
tional overlapping kinds of sociological constraints
on integration: 1) scholasticism, ‘schools’ of train-
ing, lineages that share approach, subject matter,
publication outlets, and desired rewards; 2) meth-
odological philosophy, including experimental vs.
comparative, search for a single cause vs. evaluate
spectra, hierarchical vs. single level, broad vs. spe-
cific methodologies; and 3) personality of indi-
vidual researchers, with biases toward criticism vs.
construction, quantification vs. qualitative analy-
sis, creative expression vs. technical, practical vs.
conceptual, and so on.
Different ontogenetic stages (explicitness),
different currencies, and degree of difference be-
tween the objects being integrated all are poten-
tial constraints on the integration of concepts with
phenomena, theory with theory, paradigm with
paradigm, or hierarchical integration of any of
these.
Investigative Objectivity and Changes
in Paradigm
Objectivity has two immediate sources. One re-
sides in the open-ended procedures that are ap-
plied to relating theoretical constructs to observ-
able phenomena (Figure 4). Multifaceted meth-
odological tools, including rules of evidence,
deconstruction, and multiple working hypotheses,
act as cross-checks, help to specify limits to knowl-
edge, and contextualize biases. Such procedures
encourage the individual to take a more distanced
view, particularizing their accomplishments within
evolutionary, historical, and cross-cultural perspec-
tives. It may be recognized that no one’s theory is
able to explain certain sets of observable phenom-
ena. On the other hand, when two or more theo-
ries are apparently accurate, coherent, and fruit-
ful, it may be possible to combine them into a
new paradigm. The second immediate source of
objectivity resides in the diversity of the investiga-
tive community (Longino 1990). Reduction of
bias is enhanced by the participation of investiga-
tors with different intellectual proclivities and cul-
tural backgrounds. This is important, for example,
in identifying previously understated, unstated, or
unsuspected background assumptions. This kind
of analysis may be critical for the open scrutiny of
social biases, for recognizing the construction of
power relations in dominant discourses, and for
shifting paradigms in new and creative ways.
The next section of this essay represents an
attempt to mobilize the kind of method-for-theory
we have summarized above in the service of fur-
thering integration and theory building in human
ecology, particularly as it applies to human eco-
systems.
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SECTION II.
TOWARDS A THEORY OF
HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS
Section II uses the method-for-theory outlined in
Section I to attempt to begin construction of a
theory of human ecosystems. The rationale for
seeking integration and synthesis is explored first,
and some of the motivating questions are identi-
fied. Then, following the anatomy of theory out-
lined in Section I, we systematically go through
some of the components that we have identified as
starting points for the development of a theory of
human ecosystems. This is a preliminary effort to
bring together relevant pieces of disparate research
and ideas to show the value of having a clear grasp
of the methodology behind the development of
theory, and to promote holistic thinking among
students of human ecology. Further work is obvi-
ously necessary before a coherent working theory
of human ecosystems can be developed.
A. INTEGRATION AND
     SYNTHESIS IN HUMAN
     ECOLOGY
Our motivation for promoting synthesis in human
ecology is premised on the recognition that infor-
mation flow is as central to understanding human
systems as matter and energy flows. Our premise
is that a truly human ecology should be respon-
sible for the integration of both sociocultural ecol-
ogy (traditionally the domain of the humanities)
and biophysical ecology (traditionally dominated
by the so-called ‘natural sciences’). The history of
human ecology’s disciplinary development has led
to increasing division of labor and fragmentation
of knowledge, often delimiting potential know-
how and restricting the scope of skill acquisition.
This has sometimes resulted in such specialized
worldviews that practitioners can not share com-
mon vocabularies or conceptualizations (for ex-
ample, the anthropology department at Stanford
University dividing into two departments: cultural
and social anthropology vs. anthropological ‘sci-
ences’). On the other hand, the focus resulting from
specialization within human ecology has resulted
in considerable refinement of knowledge within
each restricted domain. The discipline as a whole,
then, appears in need of synthetic integration.
There have been several calls for just such an
effort in human ecology. Redman, Grove and Kuby
(n.d.) state that “[a]lthough it is not novel to rec-
ognize the interconnectedness of humans and
the[ir] environment[s] (cf. Marsh 1864; Thomas
1956), constructing a new approach emphasizing
an integrative framework equipped with compre-
hensive models, reinforcing methods, and comple-
mentary data is a growing and urgent priority.”
Scoones (1999) reviews the potential cross-fertili-
zation of social science and ecological thinking,
identifying several research topics in social science
that actively use the principles of dynamic equilib-
rium, spatial and temporal variation, complexity
and uncertainty, including historical ecology,
‘structuration’ or contextual/interactionist perspec-
tives, and complexity in socio-ecological systems.
Our own view, that a truly holistic approach to
understanding human ecosystems must recognize
and investigate the central role of information, was
articulated almost thirty years ago by Flannery
(1972:400):
Up until now, it has mainly been the humanists
who have studied the informational aspects of
complex societies—art, religion, ritual, writing
systems, and so on. The ‘ecologists’ have largely
contented themselves with studying exchanges of
matter and energy…humanists must cease
thinking that ecology ‘dehumanizes’ history, and
ecologists must cease to regard art, religion, and
ideology as mere ‘epiphenomena’ without causal
significance. In an ecosystem approach to the
analysis of human societies, everything which
transmits information is within the province of
ecology.
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Go back to the Introduction to this essay and look
at Figures 1a, b, c, d and e again. Keep our goal of
integrating biophysical and sociocultural ecology
in mind as you read the following proposed frame-
work for a theory of human ecosystems.
Radical Synthesis
A partially nested hierarchy of paradigms relevant
to human ecology can be seen in Box 4. What
would be the nature of potential integration across
these contrasting paradigms?
For example, population and ecosystem para-
digms historically represent two apparently op-
posed approaches within bioecology (Box 5). These
paradigms can also be applied to ecological anthro-
pology (Figure 10). A recognition that populations
function as parts of ecosystems is a potential point
of integration. The ecosystem is the most inclu-
sive ecological conceptualization at any given level
in the ecohierarchy. But because it is holistic, it is
also difficult to achieve conceptually. Conceptual
stumbling blocks include the prevalence of diffuse
causality, indeterminism and the difficulties of
bounding variables and systems.
In addition to being part of natural ecosys-
tems (sensu lato), humans also define themselves
by their worldviews (± praxis) as part of constructed
world systems. This results in a hierarchy of hu-
BOX 4. PARTIAL NESTING OF SOME PARADIGMS RELEVANT TO HUMAN ECOLOGY AND SOME OF
THEIR KEY CHARACTERISTICS (Concept based on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 7.1).
Academic Paradigms relevant to the study of ecosystems
Holism
Evolution
Historical Process (La Longue Durée)
Systems Theory
Anthropological Paradigms relevant to Human Ecology sensu lato
Structuralism
World Systems Analysis
Political Economy (Marxist Anthropology)
Population Ecology (Demography)
Identity (Cultural Studies)
Kinship and Ethnicity
Interpretive and Symbolic Anthropology
Ecological Anthropological Paradigms relevant to the study of Human Ecosystems
Cultural Ecology (Functional Materialism)
Political Ecology (Expanding Contextualization)
Ethnoecology
Historical Ecology
Biocultural Studies
Evolutionary Ecology (Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness)
Analysis of Environmental Discourse
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man ecological levels something like that depicted
in Table 1. Human ecosystems may be recognized
at each of these levels, a potential starting place
for conceptual integration across subdisciplinary
paradigms. The central role of information in hu-
man ecology makes such integration more plau-
sible than it would be in biological ecology, where
the integrative potential may have to come from
focusing on questions that lie at the intersection
of the subdisciplines, questions that cannot be ad-
dressed by either of the two paradigms already
described acting alone.
In the development of an integrated theory
of human ecosystems, it is important to remem-
ber that no single objective of theory takes prece-
dence over all the others. Every theoretical objec-
tive contributes to the dialog of understanding.
This pluralistic view should help alleviate unpro-
ductive and damaging debate about what single
method is best. Moreover, a theory of human eco-
systems could at once be evolutionary/historical,
dynamic/dialectical, abstract/empirical and gen-
eral/specific (Table 2). In restricted domains, criti-
cal theory, for example, might be self-contradic-
tory and still contribute to understanding.
Fundamental Questions for an Integrated
Human Ecology
In order to radically integrate sociocultural ecol-
ogy and biophysical ecology, it is necessary to iden-
tify fundamental questions that might motivate or
‘drive’ this effort. Examples of such fundamental
integrating questions might include the following.
To what extent are the causes of modern hu-
man ills inherent to the nature of our socio-cul-
tural systems (Robbins 1999:ix)? Related to this,
why do humans persist in destroying the life-sup-
port systems of the planet (Shepard 1982:1)? At
best, will the next millenium see the conversion of
a biologically diverse planet into a completely hu-
man-dominated noösphere (cf. Wyndham
2000:87)? Questions such as these may be ad-
dressed a number of ways at a number of levels.
Perhaps new theoretical components are required
to successfully address these questions, components
that would not be recognized as relevant otherwise.
Ultimate (or historically distant) causalities, as op-
posed to proximate causalities, may be involved,
separated from considerations of system function
and the ontogeny of reproducing patterns of daily
life. Addressing these questions systematically may
Population Paradigm
The study of interrelationships between organisms and their surroundings (Ricklefs 1977). The study of
the interactions that determine the distribution and abundance of organisms (Krebs 1978).
Ecosystem Paradigm
The study of the structure and function of nature (Odum 1971), particularly the patterns of matter and
energy flow.
Toward Integration
Populations are conceived as parts of ecosystems. Thus, a holistic bioecology would entail the study of
the relationships between organism variation and the flow of matter and energy among organisms, sys-
tems, and their multiple environments.
BOX 5. DEFINITIONS OF BIOECOLOGY: POPULATION VS. ECOSYSTEMS (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and
Jones 1994, Box 1.1).
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FIGURE 10. ECOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: SUBDISCIPLINARY MOIETIES (Inspired by an unpublished diagram by
G.W. Barrett depicting the population and ecosystem approaches in biological ecology).
In ecological anthropology the population and ecosystem approaches are only partially developed, but the
strength of the discipline as a whole lies in the breadth of its subject domains, ranging from small-scale
societies (many of which are only known archaeologically) to the modern world system. The traditional
approach to integrating the information provided by the different subdisciplines is an additive one of com-
bining findings into a narrative description of human variation.
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force us to challenge the completeness, applicabil-
ity or coherence of current theory, leading us to
encompass components or relationships well out-
side currently accepted domains of explanation and
understanding.
Methodological Tools for Investigating the
Complexity of  Human Ecosystems
Methodological tools are designed to effectively
relate conceptual constructs to observable phenom-
ena (Figure 4). Some of the methodological tools
(m-tools) listed in Figure 4 that are most relevant
to the construction of a theory of human ecosys-
tems include the following.
Expanding Contextualization
While used here for theoretical purposes, the
method has applied beginnings in the East
Kalimantan project of UNESCO’s Man and the
Biosphere program (Vayda 1983). For this project,
units of analysis were sought by analyzing the so-
cial or spatial system by which resources were man-
aged (Vayda 1983:267). To do this, initially a sys-
tem of a small size was bounded, then made wider
and wider or denser and denser (Vayda 1983:265).
The strengths of expanding contextualization in-
clude: avoidance of assumptions that unnecessar-
ily reify unit or system stability; allowance for flex-
ibility in required time/money/effort; demonstra-
tion of practicality of results to lay people (policy
makers); and better understanding of dynamism
as well as stasis and persistence.
Marxian Method
In the Marxian method, priority is given to the
‘How’ (Box 6). Historical materialism creates “...an
understanding of social and structural conditions
based on internal relations of entailment rather
than external ones of cause” (McKinlay and Tay-
lor 1998), such that cause and effect become in-
terchangeable (Harvey 1996:54). The role of theory
is not to predict, but to explain through a set of
generative and transformative principles that re-
veal possibilities. “The purpose of materialist in-
quiry is not to test...but to show...forms...
domains...effects and transformative possibilities...The
problem is to explore the forms and domains of
operation” (Harvey 1996:67). Harvey’s dialectical
method closely parallels our system analysis, with
emphasis on understanding processes, flows, fluxes
and relations rather than on elements, content,
things, fixed structures and static organizations.
The dialectic (see Figure 4, methodological tools)
prioritizes a search for fundamentally contradic-
BOX 6. MARXIAN METHOD (After Harvey 1996).
In Marxian methodology, priority is given to ‘the how.’
Questions take forms such as:
• can we show...
• are there circumstances that require us to rethink…
• can we track.... and what does this mean...
• what happens if...
• in what ways...
• and in what respects can this be regarded as... (Harvey 1996:67)
For method in building theory, we encourage the avoidance/rejection of the following Marxian
assumptions and practices:
• inevitability of evolutionary historical processes
• exclusive role of the dialectic in causing evolutionary transformations
• privileged status of the working class (proletariat) as an historical agency
• ad hoc use of the concept of false consciousness to explain unsuccessful predictions
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tory forces. For human systems, dialectical fields
can be informational with associated material/en-
ergy sinks, as well as the creative dialectics identi-
fied in Marxian (and Hegelian) methodology. In
the former case, increasing amounts of energy may
be dumped into points of structural contradiction
in a human system, and these may become run-
away sinks. In a ‘bubble’ economy, for example,
governments will often keep throwing money at
fear to boost ‘consumer confidence’ even though
it is explicitly recognized that the market ‘value’ is
drastically inflated relative to real production.
Postmodern Method
Postmodern and poststructural theorists are decid-
edly against grand theory, integration and univer-
salism, yet there are several valuable methodologi-
cal insights that a developing theory of human eco-
systems can borrow from postmodern thought
(Box 7). The postmodern position advocates criti-
cal social theory that analyzes and deconstructs the
historical basis for our discourse/practice, our no-
tions of truth and modes of intellectual domina-
tion, thereby hopefully undermining their appear-
ance as the natural, i.e., inevitable, outcome of so-
ciocultural evolution (cf. Poster 1984:159). This
point of view provides valuable shifts in method-
ological perspective that forces us to continually
recognize the constructed nature of theory itself.
Also, the production and reproduction of ‘power,’
a central theme in postmodern and poststructural
analyses (cf. Russell 1938; Foucault 1972; Jameson
1991), is clearly relevant to the evolution of hu-
man ecosystems.
Causality
The targets and some of the aspects of causal ex-
planation are shown in Box 8. Causalities may be
conceptualized in a number of ways, including di-
rect, indirect, ultimate and proximate.
BOX 7. POSTMODERN METHOD (After McKinlay and Starkey 1998).
Similar to the Marxian approach, priority in this method is given to “the how” (Deetz 1998:153). But the
objective of postmodern methodology is to uncover the rules that regulate and govern social practices that
are unknown to the actors involved. To do so:
• use is made of jarring or shocking images to force us to see the ordinary with fresh vision, to
confront the strangeness of the familiar (McKinlay and Starkey 1998:5)
• the subject is taken from its central position (Burrell 1998:22)
• the ideas of human progress and enlightenment are questioned (Burrell 1998:22)
• care is given to the meaning of small details, including the attempt to record accidents, chance
and lies (Burrell 1998:22)
The Deconstructive Gesture
The essence of the deconstructive gesture (via Derrida) is to investigate the relationship between explicit
and hidden textual levels; to discover the limits of the text in order to “...understand the extent to which a
text’s objectivity and persuasiveness depend on a set of strategic exclusions” (McKinlay and Starkey
1998:11), or, why certain themes are never questioned, whereas others are condemned.
As a method for building theory, we suggest avoidance/ rejection of the following postmodern procedures:
• self contradiction, willful obscurantism and a determination to avoid totalizing at all costs
(McKinlay and Starkey 1998:5)
• a “...complex, convoluted writing style...self-consciously adopted to escape from what is seen as
the limitation and constraints of ‘clear prose’” (Burrell 1998:15)
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The Aristotelian conceptualization of causal-
ity consists of four main components: material,
efficient (mechanical), formal and final (Table 4).
Three of the four causes work at different levels of
scale, and can be considered to be hierarchical in
nature (see Figure 11). The efficient cause will act
on a small field of influence. The formal cause
operates at the ‘focal’ level of observation. Events
will transpire under conditions constrained and
permitted by the final agents of causality
(Ulanowicz 1997). Newton’s Principia led to the
dominance of the mechanical form of efficient
cause in the physical sciences (Ulanowicz 1997).
In the sciences influenced by Darwinian biology,
however, final cause (based on purpose or design)
dominates in the development of theoretical ex-
planation (Gleick 1987:201). This is true of func-
tionalist and materialist anthropology too, as seen
in the search for final causes that explain cannibal-
ism, religious practices, etc. and in the recent en-
thusiasm for evolutionary psychology’s explana-
tions of modern social behavior. Care must be taken
to avoid preconceiving the kind of causality rel-
evant to systems of interest; in most cases it is likely
that at least both efficient and final causality play
important roles.
Causation may also be either direct or indi-
rect. Patten (n.d.) discusses both direct and indi-
rect causation. Transactions are the observable
transfers of resources between organisms. Relations
BOX 8. TARGETS AND ASPECTS OF CAUSAL EXPLANATION (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 2.2
Reproduced with permission of publisher).
Phenomena—observable events, entities or relationships of interest
Patterns—repeated events, recurring entities, replicated relationships, or smooth or erratic trajectories
observed in time or space
Process—subset of phenomena in which events follow one another in time or space: these may or may
not be causally connected
Cause—necessary entailment of one event or structure by another event or structure
Mechanism—a subset of cause: refers to a direct interaction that results in a phenomenon
CAUSAL TYPE Example 1: Building a House Example 2: Writing about
Information Ecology12
MATERIAL
EFFICIENT
FORMAL
FINAL
Wood, mortar, stones, brick, etc.
Carpenters, plumbers, etc.
Blueprints
Need for shelter
Paper, ink, ideas, etc.
Information ecologists
Chapter outlines
Perception of limitations in human
ecology's understanding of human
ecosystems
12 For discussion see “Prospectus for Information Ecology” (Stepp 1999).
TABLE 4. ARISTOTELIAN CAUSAL CATEGORIES AND SOME EXAMPLES (Adapted from
Ulanowicz 1997).
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are the direct and indirect consequences of trans-
actions. Indirectness is a separation between the
organisms, a lack of direct connections between
them. Indirect effects may influence a system
through transactions that are not directly linked.
Indirect causality is more important than direct
causality in complex ecological systems (Patten n.d.).
Ultimate forms of causality refer to inherited
structures or enabling and constraining conditions
whose origins can be traced deep into the past. In
order to understand present structures/systems (cul-
tural, social, biological, physical) one must iden-
tify not only their genesis and context, but also
their evolutionary histories. Figure 12 depicts some
important features of historical transformation.
Initial conditions set the stage; boundary condi-
tions restrict potential outcomes; and transforma-
tions rupture systems to effect significant change
and mark periods of ‘internal logic.’ Internally,
priority effects and echoes of the past provide his-
torical continuity.
Hypothesis Testing
Theories that attempt universal explanations of
human ecosystem phenomena are subject to a wide
range of scale limitations that affect our ability to
derive testable hypotheses (Table 5). Currently it
is not possible for the individual researcher to judge
the success of theory that forecasts or predicts over
a very broad time scale or world system spatial
framework. Creative attempts to transcend time/
space compression and limitations of the individual
observer include, for example, historical fiction and
predictions based on thought experiments that in-
corporate current data into science fiction. De-
pending on the framework in question we find vari-
ous shortcuts used in testing hypotheses.
The dominant mode of testing is the com-
parative method (Box 9), in which complex,
multicausal models are subject to varieties of evi-
dence. The conclusions drawn are usually proba-
bilistic and contingent (Box 10). Because of the
immature development of practitioner and theory
in human ecology, predictions often seem riskier
(Box 11) than conventional forecasting and pre-
diction in other (non-human) fields of study.
UPPER LEVEL
(Final Causality)
--------------------------------
FOCAL LEVEL
(Formal Causality)
--------------------------------
(Efficient Causali ty)
LOWER LEVEL
FIGURE 11. THE TRIADIC VIEW OF CAUSALITIES
WITHIN SYSTEMS SCIENCE (Adapted from
Ulanowicz 1997).
The formal causes operate at the focal level,
while efficient causes operate from below. Final
causes are imposed from above.
BOX 9. MODES OF TESTING (Modified
somewhat from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994,
Box 2.3).
Experiment—manipulation of a system
(e.g., organism) to generate a reference state
or dynamic of known and repeatable charac-
teristics
Comparison—examination of
unmanipulated systems to determine their
likeness or contrast in state or dynamics
Correlation—statistical relationship be-
tween measurements of two properties of
systems
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FUTURE
PRESENT
PAST
PAST
PAST
Transformation 1
Transformation 2
Transformation 3
INITIAL CONDITIONS
Internal Logic
X-3
Internal Logic
X-2
Internal Logic
X-1
FIGURE 12. ULTIMATE CAUSALITY (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Figure 7.4
[Originally Pickett 1991]).
This figure depicts the (causal) role of the past in enabling and constraining present and
future conditions of ecosystems (applicable to any environment but especially the cultural
and social). It employs a Braudelian (1980) view of historical transformations which, in
combination with echoes from the past (such as features from the ancient regime), inter-
act with internal logics of the time to produce contemporary conditions. Priority effects,
or core principles (for discussion see Hallpike 1988) are persistent structures (e.g., cogni-
tive, behavioral, social) that strongly influence historical development. Disjunctures
imposed by historical transformations often create identifiable periods of social logics
(‘Internal Logics’) that are marked as such in the record (e.g., the European ‘Age of Rea-
son’). Boundary conditions (such as carrying capacity, cognitive potential, fertility and
mortality) and initial conditions constrain possible outcomes.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1
50 Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 5  2001
TABLE 5. HYPOTHESIS TESTING POSSIBILITIES: ATTEMPTS TO TRANSCEND OBSERVER MORTALITY.
Ecological
Level
Space/Time
Matrix
Means of
Forecast and/or
Prediction
Time Scale for Data
Recovery:
Testing Hypotheses and
Attempts at Circumventing
Temporal Restrictions
WORLD
SYSTEM
Coarse scale
Long term and
Increasingly Complex
E.g. Long waves of
capitalism and technology
vs. revolutions
(transformations in
structure)
Forecasting through
projection of current states
or alternatives into the
future (e.g. science fiction)
Predictions from thought
experiments and mental
models
Retrodiction with historical
fiction (comparative
statics)
Revolutions unpredictable?
Extrapolation from past
periodicity/ trends or
system relationships. (e.g.
Kondriatieff cycles)
Decades to centuries for
testing (often revisionist
historical analysis is
employed)
Short cuts attempted with
place-for-time substitutions
(e.g. 20th century hunter-
gatherers are assumed to be
analogous to an earlier stage
x in human evolutionary
history)
POPULATION
Moderate scale
Moderate complexity
Easier to forecast than
World Systems
Computer simulations of
alternative possibilities
Years to decades
Short cuts attempted with
trend analysis
INDIVIDUAL
Fine scale
Short term
Involutional levels of
psychological complexity
Predictions based on
knowledge of identity,
physiology, cognition,
ontogeny, etc.
Questions of free-will arise
(e.g. existential stance)
Months to years
Short cuts attempted with
cross-sectional studies as
substitutes for longitudinal
studies
Maximization of use of
panoptic technologies as a
way to continuously observe
subjects (e.g. video, tapped
phone lines, surveillance)
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Multiple Working Hypotheses
Chamberlin (1890, 1965) offers an important
methodological discussion that can be partly sum-
marized as follows. Hasty explanation quickly leads
to the development of tentative theory. With un-
conscious bias, a favored tentative theory rapidly
passes into an adopted theory, and then on to a
ruling theory. The defects of this common chain
of events have led historically to both the condem-
nation of theorizing in general, and to the method
of the working hypothesis. Unfortunately, a work-
ing hypothesis easily becomes a controlling idea.
To guard against this, Chamberlin urged the
method of multiple working hypotheses. He points
out that one of the chief merits of this method is
that it encourages the development of complex ex-
planations, with multiple causalities. The method
also promotes thoroughness and a habit of parallel
or complex thought wherein the practitioner ap-
pears capable of simultaneous vision from differ-
ent standpoints. Phenomena appear to be viewed
analytically and synthetically at once. He further
notes that this type of complex thought cannot be
expressed verbally in words, and that words and
thoughts lose the close association that they usu-
ally maintain with those whose silent thoughts, as
BOX 10. CONTRASTING REALMS OF TESTING (Modified from Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box
2.4).
13 See Schrader-Frechette and McCoy 1993 for discussion.
Falsification Verification
Specific models or hypotheses Complex compound models or theories
Narrow domain Broad domain
Tightly designed experiments Natural patterns or complex experiments
Univariate models Multicausal models
Logical necessity of outcome Probabilistic outcome
Simple concepts of evidence Complex concepts of evidence
Prone to Type I error13 Prone to Type II error13
Opportunity to reject contingent answers Opportunity to confirm or introduce doubt
BOX 11. KINDS AND FEATURES OF EXPEC-
TATION (From Pickett, Kolasa and Jones
1994, Box 2.5. Reproduced with per-
mission of publisher)
Prediction—a statement of expectation
deduced from the logical structure or
derived from the causal structure of a
theory
Forecast—a projection of current trends
or conditions into the future: such an
expectation may not necessarily be
derived from a theory
Safe predictions—those within the
confirmed domain of a theory which, if
incorrect, would not threaten the basic
content or structure of the theory
Risky predictions—those outside the
confirmed domain of a theory which
would, if incorrect, bring down part or
all of a theory; such predictions probe
the limits of a theory
Classification—expectations of a group
membership based on similarity or
difference in state or dynamics of
phenomena
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well as spoken thoughts, run in linear verbal
courses. He confesses that one drawback of the
method is that it introduces that difficulty in ex-
pression, and concludes that therefore there is a
certain predisposition on the part of the practitio-
ner to taciturnity. We should note that in the late
1800s, when Chamberlin wrote, graphical models
had not yet been developed to the point where they
could be used to express the kind of complex sci-
entific thought that he knew so well from his own
personal experience.
Concepts of Evidence
Concepts of evidence (Box 12) are the ways-and-
means that allow for confirmation and rejection
of the empirical content of theory, i.e. facts and
well-established generalizations. The focal mode
of thinking is white hat, the ‘checking and re-check-
ing mode’ (see Appendix), in which it is impor-
tant to specify limits to knowledge and common
sources of error in judgement. Consilience with
the D.I.F. criteria (Diversity, Independence, Fit, see
Box 12) is the ultimate standard.
BOX 12. CONCEPTS OF EVIDENCE (Based in part on Pickett, Kolasa and Jones 1994, Box 2.6,
plus Lloyd 1988).
Direct—including physical objects and eyewitness observations (vs. hearsay)
Indirect—by inference (circumstantial)
Expert Testimony—technical or other specialized judgements
Limits to Knowledge—recognition of limitations and common sources of error
Consilience
––convergence of different lines of evidence toward a unified conclusion
––accordance of two or more inferences drawn from different groups of phenomena
Diversity—variety in kinds of evidence
Independence—lines of evidence with separate origins
Fit—degree of accordance between expectations and outcomes/observations
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B. CONSTRUCTING A THEORY
     OF HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS
In previous sections, we detailed the general na-
ture of theory and its methodological applications.
Now we attempt to use these methods to mobilize
an intuitive theory of human ecosystems. We be-
gin with the identification of theoretical compo-
nents. (For explanation of the role of each compo-
nent refer back to the Anatomy of Theory in Sec-
tion I). We hope that by laying these out in an
explicit though immature theoretical frame, we can
illustrate the potential of holistic integration, pro-
voke new ideas and invite contributions to theo-
retical development.
Basic Conceptual Components of Human
Ecosystem Theory
Assumptions
Systems Comparability
One of the underlying assumptions of a theory of
human ecosystems that seeks to integrate biophysi-
cal ecology and sociocultural ecology is that these
are comparable systems. It is assumed that the heu-
ristic device we call systems analysis uncovers com-
mon and interacting properties of both that yield
fruitful insights. This assumption may become an
accepted fact once it is fully recognized and ini-
tially tested.
Continuity
There are underlying commonalities to all human
ecosystems that begin in the Upper Paleolithic and
continue through postmodernity. These common-
alities are reworked and given new expression with
every major transformation in human history. Per-
haps the most important of these is pursuit of the
supernatural. (See Core Vectors in Confirmed Gen-
eralizations, below.)
Emergent Properties and Holism
Emergent properties of human ecosystems are
manifested in ways that cannot be predicted on
the basis of the addition of individual parts alone.
Holistic analysis takes the stance that a whole is
more than the sum of its parts.
Hyperfunctionalism
A strong assumption that underlies traditional
human ecology is that of hyperfunctionalism, es-
pecially pseudo-Darwinian application of the con-
cepts of fitness and adaptation. Contrary to this
assumption, it has been recognized that culture is
not inherently adaptive (rather, it may be hypo-
functional), and many institutions do not exist
primarily because they are useful (Hallpike 1988:
22). Particularly, a cultural trait’s frequency and
survival can owe more to its relatively easy social
reproduction and the fact that it can be used to
muddle through a variety of circumstances, rather
than any adaptive efficiency (cf. Figure 12). For
many institutions this can result in “survival of the
mediocre” (Hallpike 1988: vi). In an integrated
human ecology, a priori assumptions of functional
efficiency and notions of human progress are no
longer philosophically acceptable as unproblematic.
However, it is essential to recognize them while in
the process of developing theory, because unrec-
ognized assumptions (confirmed or falsified) can
create confusion and waste time.
Definitions
Because language is our primary mode of commu-
nication, any attempt by humans to integrate
theory from multiple disciplines must carefully
define terms. If terms are poorly defined, much
time is wasted arguing at cross-purposes in low-
grade communication. Some definitions essential
to building a theory of human ecosystems include
the following.
System
A set or assemblage of things, associated, connected
or interdependent, so as to form a complex whole
(Onions 1986). For human ecosystems the defini-
tion of system boundaries is often fluid and change-
able depending on the focus of interest. Thus, in
the same analysis, an organism might be bounded
at the outer limits of its skin and later include its
tools or built environment. The key is to set the
boundaries of the system in ways that allow the
symptoms of interest to be fully expressed. To be
effective in analysis these boundary shifts must be
clearly stated.
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Environment: Population View
From a population perspective, Andrewartha and
Birch (1984) provide a Darwinian theory of the
environment (Figure 13). Taking the individual
organism (or a population of organisms) as the focal
point, the environment consists of everything that
might influence its chance to survive and repro-
duce. Functionally the environment can be divided
into directly acting components (the centrum) and
indirectly acting components (the web). The centrum
is comprised of proximate causes. The four divi-
sions of the centrum emphasized by
Andrewartha and Birch (1984) are mates, preda-
tors, resources and malentities. The web is com-
prised of branching chains of indirect influences,
the links in a chain being a living organism (or
its artifact or residue) or inorganic matter or
energy. The ecosystem construct modifies this
concept of environment.
FIGURE 13. ENVIRONMENT AS CENTRUM AND WEB (Simplified from Andrewartha and Birch
1984, Fig. 1.01).
Proximate causes of changes in the physiology or behavior of an organism are placed in
the centrum and recognized as directly acting components of environment; beyond the
centrum everything else is part of the web of components that act indirectly through an
intermediary or chain of intermediaries that ultimately influence one or another of the
components in the centrum.
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Environment: Ecosystem View
From an ecosystem point-of-view, Patten (1978)
distinguishes between input environment and out-
put environment (Figure 14). Ecosystem is defined
as IE+S+OE (Input Environment + System + Out-
put Environment). In addition, Patten’s concept
of ecosystem recognizes the significance of indi-
rect causality and the importance of information
flows in ecosystems.
Noösphere
The noösphere is the world transformed by hu-
mans and human thought. It is produced and
maintained by increasing complexity of human
interaction in cultural, social, biological and physi-
cal environments (see references in Wyndham
2000:87; and also the center illustration by
Duranceau in this volume).
FIGURE 14. ENVIRONMENT AND ECOSYSTEM (Redrawn from E. P. Odum 1983; concept based on
Patten 1978).
There are two environments, an input environment and an output environment, defined by
the focal animal or system; altogether they define the ecosystem: IE+S+OE=ECOSYSTEM.
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Concepts
Human Ecosystem
The human ecosystem concept adopted here is
based on Patten’s ideas (including the idea of fil-
ters/screens), combined with the concept of mul-
tiple environments (see Figure 15). Thus a human
system can be thought of as a locus in a set of envi-
ronments, which together with inputs and outputs
constitute a human ecosystem. This concept can
be expanded to a scaled hierarchy of human eco-
systems (Figure 16).
We recognize the central role of information
in human ecosystems. This is the starting point
for most if not all identified observations, facts,
confirmed generalizations and hypotheses devel-
oped to date.
According to Wilkinson (1995), with the evo-
lutionary emergence of the nation-state, human
ecosystems must be defined as entailing at least two
somewhat independent state-level civilizations that
are geographically separated, periodically hostile,
FIGURE 15. PARTIAL CONCEPT OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS AND THE HUMAN ECOSYSTEM
(Cover, Georgia Journal of Ecological Anthropology 1997).
Concentric spheres denote an evolutionary arrangement of the different environments,
with an aggregated consumer symbol at the center. Information inputs and outputs to
and from the system pass through epistemological filter/field/editor/screens.
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FIGURE 16. PARTIAL CONCEPT OF MULTIPLE ENVIRONMENTS APPLIED TO A SCALED HIERARCHY
OF HUMAN ECOSYSTEMS.
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and competing socio-cultural systems (Figure 17).
It is the interaction and interrelationship of com-
peting nation-states (Wilkinson’s Central Civiliza-
tion), including warfare, that maintains nation-
state human ecosystemic structure and function.
Note that the definition of pre-nation-state human
ecosystems may or may not incorporate Wilkinson’s
principle.
Evolution
Diverse possible evolutionary outcomes are often
overlooked in theory. Table 6 depicts a scheme
relating mode and tempo of evolution in such a
way as to clarify the concept, particularly in light
of dichotomous debates regarding the nature of
evolution, whether physical, biological, social or
cultural. Ecosystem evolution may tend to result
in networked mutualisms dependent more on in-
direct than direct causality (see Jorgensen
1992:340).
Hierarchy and Scale
The conceptual skills for traversing hierarchy and
scale with ease must be acquired for application of
human ecosystems theory to different organiza-
tional levels and temporal junctures (for a thor-
ough treatment see Allen and Hoekstra 1992). This
entails skill at recognizing parts of a system (e.g.,
cells) and then subsuming the parts into larger sys-
tems (e.g., individuals) which themselves become
subsystems of still larger systems (e.g., communi-
ties, nations) and so on. Systems at different scales
may exhibit different properties. Braudel’s (1980)
longue durée of human history is one example of
the heuristic value of situating event histories
within larger structural patterns over time.
FIGURE 17. WORLD SYSTEM OF COMPETING NATION STATES (Concept based on Wilkinson
1995).
Central Civilization defined as the interaction of competing nation-states. The state-
level human ecosystem is minimally made up of two competing nation-states. The flows
are information and materials.
Nation
State
X
Nation
State
YZ
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Paradoxical Ontologies, Strange Loops and
Perverse Functions
Paradoxes and perversities are ubiquitous in hu-
man systems (cf. Smith and Berg 1987). Specifi-
cally, we have identified these as ‘paradoxical on-
tologies’ and ‘perverse functions.’ A paradox is
defined in early usage (c.1570) as a statement or
condition that is apparently self-contradictory, but
possibly true. Bateson (2000) casts a paradox as a
question that requires us to take sides—both sides
at once (the ‘double bind’).  In any case, paradoxi-
cal ontologies exist throughout hierarchical levels
in any system, expressed in many ways, including
visual art and ritual systems. Paradoxical ontolo-
gies are a primary function of being human.
Graphic representations expressing complexity of-
ten incorporate paradoxes and contradictions, de-
picted as ‘strange loops’ or tangled hierarchies
(Wilden 1986). Wilden identifies the paradoxical
characteristics of human information environments
as semiotic oscillation. As our brains attempt to
reconcile contradictory information, visual input
and cognitive processing oscillate back and forth
between the two simultaneous but apparently con-
tradictory interpretations. A related category is that
of perverse function, characterized by irony and
juxtaposition. Perverse functions are a secondary
characteristic of humans acting together in com-
plex, socially constrained environments. Political
cartoons are typically commentaries on perverse
functions in contemporary society.
TABLE 6. SCHEME RELATING EVOLUTIONARY MODES AND TEMPOS: A PARTIAL MATRIX OF
POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS.
                  MODE
Non-Directional Change Directional Change
(unfolding, progressive,
 cumulative vs. cyclic)
Short Period
transmogrification ?
Long Period
?
progressive
transformational
discontinuous
Short Period
drift ? ? ? ?
Long Period
drift ? ? ? ?
Short Period
Long Period
dynamic stability is the dominant process:
the system maintains structure and identity;
‘stabilizing selection’
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Externalized Cognition
Externalized cognition is the externalization of
knowledge/cognition manifested in communica-
tive signs, behavior or material artifacts. For hu-
mans, language is the most obvious form of exter-
nalized cognition, but the domain includes such
things as smoke signals, rolex watches, maps, art,
blitzkrieg, ritual acts, traffic signals and the abacus
(cf. Gumperz and Levinson 1991). Because of its
role in the evolution and maintenance of sociality,
externalized cognition can be considered a genera-
tive principle for human ecosystems. Complex so-
cial structures are based in part on the differential
distribution of externalized cognition (a Confirmed
Generalization).
Empirical Content Of Human Ecosystem
Theory
Observations
System Controls
Human (social) systems are not closed teleological
systems controlled from outside, but are ecologi-
cal networks in dynamic interaction with other
systems, including other social systems and bio-
physical systems. They have both centralized and
diffuse/varied control mechanisms (Patten and
Odum 1981; see Figure 1.b), apparently domi-
nated by indirect causality.
Insular Logic
All belief systems have an insular logic; i.e., they
are closed within the framework of their founda-
tion assumptions, impervious to input not speci-
fied as legitimate in advance. “… In this web of
belief every strand depends upon every other
strand, and a [member of the cultural system] can-
not get out of its meshes because it is the only world
[s]he knows” (Evans-Pritchard in Horton
1993:222). Insular logics are usually dynamic sys-
tems; to understand one part an outsider must of-
ten make the effort to understand the whole. The
reorganization of insular logics may cause major
transformational disjunctures (in psychological and
social systems), particularly when foundational as-
sumptions are effectively challenged. An example
at the individual level is the ‘Born Again’ or con-
version experience. Conversely, general system cri-
ses may provoke explicit recognition of previously
unacknowledged assumptions. For example, after
the 1929 U.S. stock market crash the role of con-
sumer confidence and ‘belief in the system’ both
in creating and bursting financial bubbles became
common knowledge.
Accepted Facts
Humans Sacrifice Enormous Amounts of Wealth
in Pursuit of the Supernatural
In Iron Age Denmark, valuable enemy ships were
dragged inland and scuttled along with swords,
axes, and horses as offerings to lake deities in grati-
tude for victory in battle (Klesius 2000:31). The
Pharoahs of Egypt sequestered vast fortunes for
their voyages in the afterlife. Trillions of dollars have
been spent on space exploration, which serves ideo-
logical purposes for earthlings, inspiring faith in
the manifest destiny of our continual territorial ex-
pansion and our status as chosen capitalists-in-con-
trol-of-the-world-and-beyond. Are these seemingly
irrational expenditures the norm for all societies?
Confirmed Generalizations
Causality in Complex Human Systems
Forrester (1969:9-10,110) provides some notes on
causality in complex human systems. He points
out that in complex systems cause and effect are
often not closely related in either time or space.
Further, apparent causes close in time to observed
symptoms are usually not true cause and effect re-
lationships, but instead coincident symptoms aris-
ing from the dynamics of system structure. He
notes that for human social systems, causes are usu-
ally found, not in prior events, but in the structure
and policies of the system. These generalizations
compliment Patten’s emphasis on the importance
of indirect causality in non-human ecosystems (see
Causality, above).
Wallerstein (1999:1; following systems theory
of dissipative structures cf. Prigogine 1984) posits
varying causal effects historically in human systems
at different stages of development. For human sys-
tems during phases of normal development, large
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inputs have small outputs (i.e., it is difficult to
change the course of history), whereas during a
phase of demise (or bifurcation), small inputs have
large outputs (seemingly trivial events trigger drastic
change). Causal direction or outcome may be in-
herently unpredictable, especially during periods
of system demise.
Unique Properties of Human Ecosystems
Human systems demonstrate a number of unique
ecosystem properties, including the following. (1)
Human systems have internalized representations
of the system itself and can generate or reformu-
late goals for all or parts of the system (G. Bateson
in M.C. Bateson 1972:102). This adds reflexive
informational complexity to ecosystem analyses,
although it is unclear how effective internal direc-
tion is in the long-run. (2) Expression of the maxi-
mum power principle (see H.T. Odum 1983) by
modern human ecosystems on a global scale is in-
creasingly destructive of biological and cultural
diversity. Global capitalism is the latest expression
of this vector.
Core Vectors of Human Ecosystem Evolution
At least three core vectors are common processes
in human ecosystem development. The human
practice of externalizing cognition (see Concepts,
above) is the generative principle underlying all of
these vectors. The three core vectors interrelate
involutionally over time. (1) Technosubstitution: the
progressive substitution of technological structure
(fabricated and domesticated) for biological and
physical structure. (2) Historical Canalization: the
strong (though not exclusive) role of the past in
determining historical trajectories (Figure 12).
Fundamental structural change is difficult because,
among other reasons, an increasingly architectured
(technosubstituted) output environment domi-
nates the informational input environments. In-
sular logics, taboos and voluntary blinders also play
a role. (3) Seeking the Supernatural: ubiquitous
among human systems, at least for the past 30,000
years, human relations with the supernatural (in-
formational, material and energetic) cannot be ig-
nored in an integrated or holistic understanding
of human ecosystems.
Derived Conceptual Components
Of Human Ecosystem Theory
Hypotheses
Examples of as-yet-untested hypotheses include the
following. (1) “The cybernetic nature of self and
the world tends to be imperceptible to conscious-
ness” (G. Bateson, in M.C. Bateson 1972:16). Re-
lated to this is the (emic) perception of imagined
human environments as unlimited in resources and
lacking in even material feedback loops (i.e., we can
throw trash ‘away’). (2) With the advent of the na-
tion-state, biophysical environments become
thought of as less and less important relative to
interpolity information interactions, which come to
dominate both input and output environments.
Models
A basic conceptual model for human ecosystems
is that of a system locus in multiple environments
(Figure 15). Information ‘flows’ in and between
physical, biological, social and cultural environ-
ments (a general evolutionary sequence). Informa-
tion inputs and outputs are subject to epistemo-
logical filter/field/editor/screens, located both in-
side and at the outer boundaries of the system (see
Stepp 1999 for discussion).
Framework and Structure of Human
Ecosystem Theory
Framework
Human ecosystem theory does not yet have a co-
herent theoretical framework or structure. Rela-
tionships between conceptual devices still need to
be laid out. Only a beginning has been made at
working out assumptions, theoretical constraints
and the conceptual inputs and outputs for theo-
retical models. Some basic requirements for frame-
work development have been identified, however.
For one, the theoretical framework must be open,
making integration with other existing and evolv-
ing ecological and anthropological theory possible.
For another, the scope of the theory must take into
account several thousand years of human socio-
cultural evolution.
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Domain
The minimal domains of inquiry for a compre-
hensive theory of human ecosystems includes hunt-
ing and gathering systems (late Pleistocene and
early Holocene); horticultural based systems;
wood-fuel based ancient states and empires, fossil-
fuel nation-states (first to early second industrial
revolution; modernity) and the post-WWII world
system.
Translation Modes
The application of theoretical frameworks to the
complexities of the ‘real-world’ can help identify
errors of abstraction and idealization, making it a
most useful and sometimes indispensable step in
the development of theory. Forrester (1969) pro-
vides an illustrative example of the potential of
applying theoretical models to aid understanding
of real-world problems. In the late 1960s at MIT
he participated in a series of informal discussions
with John Collins, a former mayor of Boston, and
others, exploring the applications of his research
on the dynamics of complex systems to modeling
pressing urban dilemmas of the time. Not only did
he find that the concepts and modeling framework
that he had developed were applicable to urban
problems, but that the interaction with people in-
timately concerned with the inner workings of this
human ecosystem confirmed generalizations and
generated new hypotheses about complex systems
in general. For example, complex systems are usu-
ally counterintuitive and complex human systems
stubbornly resist top-down policy changes
(Forrester 1969:109).
The application of human ecology theory to
management goals (cf. Hens et al. 1998) may yield
fruitful insight into the causal effectiveness of con-
scious purpose in system evolution. Bateson
(1972:31) noted the need for “a formal descrip-
tion of the ways in which human planning and
applied science tend to generate pathology in the
society or in the ecosystem or in the individual.”
Research taboos may be most easily identified in
this phase of application and testing, as restrictions
on the acceptability of overly negative or hopeless
conclusions about human systems become appar-
ent when presented to the public. Real understand-
ing of human ecosystems is a prerequisite for ef-
fective biological and cultural conservation efforts
worldwide.
Other applications and their translation
modes are political in nature. In the past, social
revolutions, civil rights, and liberation movements
have all depended on increased public understand-
ing of the nature of the social systems they lived in
(see Wallerstein 1999:19-33 for specific examples).
Conversely, advances in understanding the nature
of human ecosystems might give political control
advantages to unintended agents (cf. Davis 1984,
an example of governmental use of social science
techniques in policing efforts).
C. ONTOGENY OF HUMAN
     ECOSYSTEM THEORY
We are at the intuitive stage of theory development
for human ecosystems (see Figure 9 and Box 3).
Some progress has been made in developing defi-
nitions and basic concepts. The empirical content
is largely descriptive and unconsolidated. Models
are just beginning to be developed. Framework is
incipient.
It is possible that most of the components for
a useful theory of human ecosystems already exist.
If so, these components are widely dispersed among
many different disciplines. The challenge is to bring
these components together in the development of
theory. How this is done depends on the relations
of human ecology to the broader intellectual com-
munity and the public at large.
D. ECOLOGICAL
     UNDERSTANDING AND THE
     INTELLECTUAL
     COMMUNITY AT LARGE
Developing a theory of human ecosystems is more
than impractical. It is taboo.
Practically Impossible?
Pass the buck. Some other discipline should be re-
sponsible. Not mine. Certainly not me. I don’t have
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the knowledge required for such a monumental task.
Understanding human ecosystems requires
radical synthesis. It requires an integration of
knowledge and perhaps social discipline previously
limited to warfare. It requires creativity previously
limited to practitioners of the arts and humani-
ties. Development of a working theory of human
ecosystems may take hundreds if not thousands of
years.
True, a diversity of expertise is needed. True,
you can’t have empirical holism in the sense that
all of the details are included in a model with the
aim of understanding the ecosystem. But concep-
tual holism is possible. Increased understandings
plausibly follow on attempts at holistic
conceptualization.
In our capitalist/postmodern world, under-
standing of social phenomena as holistic systems
processes with a central informational component
is perhaps most developed in economics. The glo-
bal economy is commonly referred to as a system
with hierarchical structure (local/regional economic
subsystems), flows (both material and informa-
tional), and varied inputs and outputs. For ex-
ample, a practically possible model for the initial
development of human ecosystem theory is appar-
ent in the analysis of the recent so-called Asian Fi-
nancial Crisis. The role of panic in precipitating
economic collapse was recognized in media cover-
age, though the speculation and financial manipu-
lations underlying the panic remained primarily
as subtext, while geopolitics remained sub-subtext
(Wallerstein 1999:49). A world systems perspec-
tive reveals cyclical predatory trends in the rela-
tions between First World economies and Third
World economies. The former speculates in ‘de-
velopment’ of emerging economies and newly
opened labor markets (but pull out when that seems
more advantageous), while the latter is increasingly
bound and controlled by debt restrictions (and
deals with the psychological, cultural and social
repercussions of collapse).14 This system is sup-
ported by international infrastructures largely con-
trolled by First World institutions (IMF, WTO,
World Bank) that lend capital to emerging econo-
mies in return for de facto control of profitable sec-
tors of the political economy.
Understanding human ecosystems at this level
is clearly a task that requires contributions from a
wide range of disciplines. It requires intellectual
team-work.
Taboo?
Human systems resist and prohibit complete dis-
closure of how they actually work. It may be intel-
lectually taboo to ask certain questions about the
system. For example, can we include questions
about basic human/system factors such as military
influence in models of current human ecosystems?
Part of the ancient regime, the military is one
of the defining institutions of civilization, setting
paradoxical standards for the emerging cultural
concept of efficiency (e.g., mass destruction), and
expanding the realm of the supernatural (e.g.,
nuclear winter). Wilkinson’s Principle (Figure 17
and text above) recognizes that nation-states exist
within the framework of competing interaction
with ‘foreign’ enemies. Enemies must be created at
the level of the nation-state in order for civiliza-
tion to exist.
The influence of the military on the develop-
ment and maintenance of modern civilizations is
generally unacknowledged. What is apparent is that
in warfare the military system pushes the limits of
social organization. It also pushes the limits of tech-
nology. But what of its role or influence in ‘peace
time’? There may be a liberal taboo on investigat-
ing the connection between the military and so-
cial organization in ‘peace time,’ but it is clear that
the contributions of the military-industrial com-
plex are important in organizing and training lead-
ership (McKinlay and Starkey 1998) that main-
tains the social hierarchy. Technological hand-me-
downs in ‘peace time’ also contribute to reinforc-
ing patterns within the general cultural system (e.g.,
cell-phones, e-mail, GPS).
14After pressure from the International Monetary Fund prompted Indonesian General Suharto’s resignation in 1998 (he
is estimated to have taken $16 billion with him), his successor President Habibie called for the Indonesian people to
work together to overcome the country’s economic crisis. He called on them to conserve scarce resources by fasting
on Mondays and Thursdays of every week (Galeano 2000:177).
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These influences are not accurately reflected
in the energy flow models of modern nation-states.
Indirect informational effects are dominant in the
unconsciousness of ‘peace time.’ But even recog-
nizing topical taboos helps us understand the na-
ture of the system. It might be suggested that the
extent of totalitarian control in our ecosystems can
be measured in part by the thoroughness of taboo
on investigating the role of the military. Institu-
tional secrecy and strategic exclusion of certain
kinds of system information requires methodol-
ogy that exposes system structure, relations and
histories. For this task a postmodern methodology
may be prescribed as the most effective so far at
identifying taboos and exposing hidden patterns
and assumptions.
E. BACK TO THE BEGINNING
As an ending to this Prelude to Human Ecosys-
tems we should return to Rappaport’s (1971, 1984)
model of ritual regulation and ecosystem function
among the Maring (Figure 1e). The boldness of
his accomplishment was in combining native and
academic views of major human ecosystem com-
ponents in a cybernetic model. Whether the sys-
tem is (was) cybernetic is open to question. We are
some distance from understanding the manner and
degree to which human ecosystems are self-regulating.
In this essay we have laid out a prelude to a
theory of human ecosystems that is still at the in-
tuitive stage of development (Figure 9). We have
emphasized comparatively simple conceptual
themes, particularly the importance of including
information, belief systems, worldviews and pur-
suit of the supernatural in our understandings of
human ecosystems. Rappaport’s model not only
includes the supernatural, but also the cycle of war-
fare and peace, linked to the economic system. We
propose that a similar systems approach is neces-
sary to understand not only ‘traditional’ small-scale
societies, but the global postmodern world as well.
It is up to future generations to break the taboos that
prevent the development of such understanding.
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The Six Thinking Hats Method
Notes from de Bono 1990b
De Bono’s six thinking hats method is designed to switch thinking away from the normal argumenta-
tive style to a mapmaking style. The purpose of the hats is to unscramble thinking so that one is able to
use one thinking mode at a time, alternating them in a constructive way. The six thinking hats do not
cover every possible aspect of thinking, only the main modes.
The idiom of the hats is very artificial. This is its greatest value. The hats provide an innocent
formality, a naïve convenience for requesting a certain type of thinking, either of oneself or of others. In
social contexts, where teamwork is important, they establish some rules for the game of thinking; all the
team players are aware of these rules. The more the hats are used, the more they become part of the
team thinking-culture. Focused thinking becomes much more effective, a brisk and disciplined ap-
proach instead of wasting time in argument and pointless talk around the topic of discussion. Without
the formality of the hats, some participants may remain permanently stuck in one mode of thinking,
usually the black hat mode.
At first you may feel a bit awkward using the different hats, but that soon passes as the possibilities
of the system become apparent.
Appendix
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Black Hat
Devil’s advocate, negative assessment, why it won’t work. What is wrong, doesn’t fit, incorrect, risky,
dangerous, in error. Negative questions, not argument.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jea/vol5/iss1/1 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2162-4593.5.1.1
68 Journal of Ecological Anthropology Vol. 5  2001
Red Hat
Seeing red and sharing euphoria, making “feelings” visible. Stating values, but not trying to justify
them, nor attempting to make them logical. Also sharing complex judgements such as hunches, intui-
tions, senses of, and aesthetic tastes.
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White Hat
Lab coat, facts, figures, probabilities, tightening-up questions, checking and re-checking, striving for
objectivity, specifications of limits to knowledge.
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Yellow Hat
Sunshine, optimism, positive opportunity seeking, constructive logical assessment, concrete proposals.
Sharing dreams, visions and hopes. Probing for value and benefit. Making things happen.
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Green Hat
Fertile, creative, lateral thinking. Suspending critical judgement. Searching for alternatives. Going be-
yond the known, the obvious and the satisfactory. No justification needed. Provocative patterns of
thought and movement of ideas are the goals; symbolized by the word po, the laxative of language, the
opposite of no.
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Blue Hat
Cool thinking from the control tower. Monitoring and coordinating. Organizing the thinking. Setting
the focus. Defining the problems. Shaping the tasks. Providing summaries, overviews and conclusions.
Thinking about thinking. Enforcing the discipline. Calling forth the hats.
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